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Developing countries face unique difﬁ  culties preparing 
for an inﬂ  uenza pandemic. Our current top-down approach 
will not provide these countries with adequate supplies of 
vaccines and antiviral agents. Consequently, they will have 
to use a bottom-up approach based on inexpensive generic 
agents that either modify the host response to inﬂ  uenza 
virus or act as antiviral agents. Several of these agents 
have shown promise, and many are currently produced in 
developing countries. Investigators must primarily identify 
agents for managing infection in populations and not simply 
seek explanations for how they work. They must determine 
in which countries these agents are produced and deﬁ  ne 
patterns of distribution and costs. Because prepandemic re-
search cannot establish whether these agents will be effec-
tive in a pandemic, randomized controlled trials must begin 
immediately after a new pandemic virus has emerged. With-
out this research, industrialized and developing countries 
could face an unprecedented health crisis.
M
ore than a decade ago, the ﬁ  rst human cases of dis-
ease caused by avian inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) ap-
peared in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. Six years ago, inﬂ  uenza virus A 
(H5N1) reemerged to cause highly lethal human disease in 
Southeast Asia. Health ofﬁ  cials are concerned that these 
cases could be the harbinger of the next inﬂ  uenza pandemic. 
As a result, virtually all industrialized countries and many 
developing countries have mounted extensive pandemic 
preparedness efforts. However, as pointed out recently by 
Oshitani et al., industrialized countries face “unique and 
difﬁ  cult issues, which make preparing for a pandemic more 
challenging” (1).
Why a Top-Down Approach to Confronting 
the Next Pandemic Will Not Work 
If a pandemic form of inﬂ   uenza virus A (H5N1) 
emerges within the next few years, all countries will have 
to depend almost entirely on egg-derived inactivated adju-
vanted inﬂ  uenza vaccines. For developing countries, this 
approach will not succeed. Estimates show that within the 
ﬁ  rst 6–9 months of a pandemic outbreak, vaccine compa-
nies will be only able to produce enough doses to vaccinate 
≈700 million persons (2). This number is less than the com-
bined populations of the 9 countries that produce almost all 
of the world’s seasonal inﬂ  uenza vaccines. These countries 
will ﬁ  rst use their vaccines to ensure that their own popula-
tions are protected. Non–vaccine-producing countries, both 
industrialized and developing, will have to wait.
In 2005, a representative of the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) Global Programme on Inﬂ  uenza  con-
cluded that “most developing countries will have no ac-
cess to a vaccine during the ﬁ  rst wave of a pandemic and 
perhaps throughout its duration” (2). Since then, WHO 
has worked to build a stockpile of ≈150 million doses of 
vaccine against inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) for developing 
countries (3), and 2 companies have pledged to provide 
WHO with 110 million doses. In 2007, a WHO scientiﬁ  c 
consultation on how to use this stockpile concluded, “If 
there is sufﬁ  cient early warning that an outbreak of inﬂ  u-
enza (H5N1) is due to a virus that is capable of sustained 
human-to-human transmission, then theoretically there 
may be a relatively limited ‘window of opportunity’ to 
stop the spread of the virus before it spreads nationally or 
internationally. … However, a containment effort would 
be feasible only in settings where the number of local-
ized cases are [sic] still limited, where adequate logistical 
support is available, and where the national government 
is supported by international assistance” (3). The vaccine 
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stockpile on which these efforts would depend does not 
yet exist.
Several industrialized countries are stockpiling vac-
cines against inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) that might be used 
for prepandemic vaccination, but Oshitani et al. note that 
“both pandemic and prepandemic vaccines would not be 
available in developing countries unless an international 
mechanism exists to share such vaccine with them at low 
cost” (1). Even if limited supplies of vaccines could be pro-
duced for developing countries, no international mechanism 
is in place to pay for and distribute the vaccines, and WHO 
has yet to announce plans to set one up. Thus, when the 
next pandemic virus emerges, almost no vaccines will be 
available in developing countries to slow its spread (1,2).
Because global supplies of vaccines against pandemic 
viruses will be limited, government ofﬁ  cials in a few in-
dustrialized countries have placed their hopes on stockpiles 
of antiviral agents, primarily oseltamivir, an expensive 
neuraminidase inhibitor. In 2005, WHO established its 
Southeast Asian Inﬂ  uenza Clinical Research Network to 
study neuraminidase inhibitor treatment of patients infect-
ed with viruses that possess pandemic potential (4). How-
ever, inﬂ  uenza virus A (H1N1) has developed resistance to 
oseltamivir, and similar antiviral resistance could develop 
in a future pandemic virus. Five million treatment courses 
(10 doses per patient) of oseltamivir have been donated to 
a WHO stockpile, but WHO has no plans to dramatically 
increase the size of this stockpile. On their own, the gov-
ernments of a few countries that do not produce inﬂ  uenza 
vaccines or antiviral agents have purchased supplies of os-
eltamivir, but their stockpiles are sufﬁ  cient to treat only 1% 
of their combined populations (D.S. Fedson, unpub. data). 
Not surprisingly, developing countries themselves “will not 
allocate scarce resources to stockpile signiﬁ  cant quantities 
of oseltamivir for an unpredictable inﬂ  uenza pandemic” 
(1). Clearly, the limited supplies of antiviral agents avail-
able to developing countries where these infections now 
occur will scarcely have any effect on a pandemic after it 
starts to spread.
Inﬂ  uenza virologists report that recent isolates of high-
ly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza viruses (H5N1 and H7N1) have 
acquired molecular characteristics suggesting they might 
become more easily transmissible among humans (5,6). In 
Indonesia, physicians have reported that everyone infected 
with the clade 2 inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) who did not re-
ceive antiviral treatment has died (Table 1) (7). Given ex-
tremely limited global supplies of antiviral agents, this is a 
terrifying observation. If a pandemic virus were to emerge 
with a level of virulence approaching that of inﬂ  uenza virus 
A (H5N1) in Indonesia, it could lead to a global population 
collapse. Many inﬂ  uenza virologists doubt this will ever 
happen and believe instead that inﬂ  uenza virus (H7N7) or 
reemergent inﬂ  uenza virus (H2N2) could also cause the 
next pandemic. Chances are they might be right. Moreover, 
health ofﬁ  cials in national governments and international 
agencies estimate that expected pandemic deaths will be no 
more than what can be extrapolated from the 1918–1920 
pandemic (8). These ofﬁ  cials seldom, if ever, use the phras-
es “population collapse” or “population die off,” and their 
estimates may also be right. Nonetheless, in a seminal ex-
periment reported in 1974, Webster and Campbell showed 
that genetic reassortment, the process that gave rise to pan-
demic viruses in 1957 and 1968, could give rise to a readily 
transmissible virus of extraordinary virulence (Figure) (9). 
This experiment and human experience with inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus A (H5N1) in Indonesia suggest it would be prudent for 
all countries to plan for something much worse than what 
occurred in 1918–1920.
The current approach to pandemic planning for all 
countries involves small groups of health ofﬁ  cials, inﬂ  u-
enza scientists, and company executives, most of whom 
come from industrialized countries. For the foreseeable 
future, this top-down approach will be incapable of pro-
viding developing countries with timely supplies of afford-
able vaccines and antiviral agents. (Most industrialized 
countries that do not produce inﬂ  uenza vaccines will have 
similar difﬁ  culties, at least for the ﬁ  rst pandemic wave.) 
The Indonesian Health Minister, for one, understands this. 
With little prospect that people in her country will be able 
to obtain vaccines against pandemic viruses, she precipi-
tated a standoff with WHO by announcing in February 
2007 that unless Indonesia is able to gain access to supplies 
of vaccines against pandemic viruses, her country will no 
longer share its inﬂ  uenza viruses A (H5N1) with WHO’s 
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Table 1. Relationship between time of onset of antiviral treatment and case-fatality rate in persons with avian influenza A (H5N1) 
disease in Indonesia, 2003–2007*
Interval between onset of illness and treatment  No. cases  No. deaths  Case-fatality rate, % 
<24 h  2 0 0
0–4 d  11 5 45
0–6 d  37 24 65
>6 d  49 40 82
Any treatment  86 64 74
No treatment  33 33 100
All cases  119 97 82
*Adapted from (7). Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries
laboratory-based surveillance system (2). Despite unortho-
dox arguments (10), her position has garnered wide support 
from the health ministers of many developing countries 
(11). Recently, Indonesia agreed to share inﬂ  uenza virus 
A (H5N1) sequences (not the viruses themselves) with the 
Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Inﬂ  uenza Data, but the 
country no longer promptly reports deaths from inﬂ  uenza 
virus A (H5N1), in deﬁ  ance of new International Health 
Regulations. WHO has been unable to come up with a solu-
tion to this impasse.
In identifying the major issues and challenges of a 
pandemic threat facing developing countries, Oshitani et 
al. have called for better preparedness planning, improved 
systems for medical care and public health, expanded use of 
nonpharmaceutical interventions, and strengthened core ca-
pacities for seasonal inﬂ  uenza surveillance and vaccination 
(1). They recognize that this is a challenge few developing 
countries will be able to meet, but go on to say, “Prepar-
ing for a pandemic by simply strengthening preparedness 
within a single country is not possible. A pandemic is a 
global issue, and pandemic preparedness should be con-
sidered from a global perspective” (1). In practical terms, 
what exactly does this mean? The record thus far indicates 
that truly international efforts to prepare for pandemic vac-
cination and antiviral use have been meager. In almost all 
instances, these efforts have been vastly outweighed by ef-
forts that reﬂ  ect national concerns and interests.
A Bottom-Up Approach that Developing Countries 
Can Use to Confront the Next Pandemic
A top-down approach will not ensure that adequate and 
affordable supplies of vaccines against pandemic viruses 
and antiviral agents can be produced and distributed in 
time to protect populations in developing countries. Trans-
ferring technology for vaccine and antiviral agent produc-
tion to a small number of developing countries will proceed 
slowly and will inevitably fail to meet the needs of neigh-
boring countries not favored by these programs (12). Con-
sequently, developing countries must consider an alterna-
tive bottom-up approach to pandemic control, an approach 
based on existing healthcare workers and institutions and 
that uses inexpensive and widely available generic agents 
that have intrinsic antiviral activities or that modify the host 
response (13,14).
Many inﬂ   uenza scientists doubt this approach will 
work (14–16). Nonetheless, as reviewed elsewhere (13,14), 
several retrospective studies suggest that outpatient statins 
(drugs taken to lower cholesterol levels and prevent car-
diovascular diseases) reduce 30-day pneumonia mortality 
rates by ≈50% (Table 2) (17–22). Most investigators agree 
that these observational studies must be interpreted with 
caution and that promising results should be followed by 
prospective clinical trials. One such trial is already under 
way, and a preliminary report has shown that in 67 pneu-
monia patients in intensive care units, treatment with sta-
tins reduced the hospital mortality rate by 51% (p = 0.026) 
(23). Pulmonary investigators also believe that peroxisome 
proliferator–activated receptor (PPAR) α and PPARγ ago-
nists (ﬁ  brates and glitazones, respectively) could be used 
to treat acute lung injury (14). An important experimental 
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Figure. Genetic reassortment and genesis of a new pandemic 
inﬂ   uenza virus. This study was designed to determine whether 
the selection and transmission of a new reassortant inﬂ  uenza A 
virus could occur under experimental conditions in vivo that mimic 
what might occur in nature. Reassortment between 2 antigenically 
distinct inﬂ  uenza A viruses was studied in turkeys that had been 
previously immunized to induce low levels of antibodies to the 
hemagglutinin (H) of a nonlethal turkey inﬂ  uenza virus (Turkey), 
and to the neuraminidase (N) of a fowl plague virus (FPV), an avian 
virus that is highly pathogenic for chickens. Twenty-eight days after 
immunization, the immunized turkeys were sequentially infected, 
ﬁ  rst with the Turkey virus and 4 h later with FPV. During the ﬁ  rst few 
days, both parent viruses were isolated from the infected turkeys, 
but by day 4 a reassortant virus containing the FPV hemagglutinin 
and the Turkey neuraminidase (FPV(H)–Turkey(N)) was also isolated; 
within 2 days it became the dominant virus. All infected turkeys died, 
and only the FPV(H)–Turkey(N) reassortant virus could be recovered. 
In a separate experiment, similarly immunized turkeys were again 
sequentially infected, but on day 5 a group of nonimmunized or 
selectively immunized turkeys (Turkey(H) FPV(N)) were placed in the 
same room. All contact birds soon died of fulminant infection caused 
by the FPV(H)–Turkey(N) reassortant virus. These experiments 
demonstrated that under conditions of selective primary immunity, 
a new virus could be generated through genetic reassortment in 
vivo and that this reassortant virus could be readily transmitted 
to contacts. The reassortant virus caused uniformly fatal disease 
in primary infected and contact birds. Thus, under the conditions 
of these experiments, genetic reassortment gave rise to a new 
inﬂ  uenza virus that led to a total population collapse. Adapted from 
Webster and Campbell (9). PERSPECTIVE
study has shown that the ﬁ  brate gemﬁ  brozil, a PPARα ago-
nist used to prevent heart disease, reduced mortality rates 
in mice infected with inﬂ  uenza virus (H2N2) by 54% (24). 
Statins and PPAR agonists have antiinﬂ  ammatory and im-
munomodulatory activities, and there is considerable mo-
lecular cross-talk between these agents (14). Moreover, 
combination treatment is safe, and in patients with cardio-
vascular diseases, clinical beneﬁ  ts are additive. Used either 
alone or together, this treatment might similarly beneﬁ  t pa-
tients during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
Other generic agents, some with direct activity against 
inﬂ  uenza virus, should also be considered (14). Chloro-
quine, long used as an antimalarial drug, increases endo-
somal pH and acts as an antiviral agent by impairing virus 
release into the cytosol. Resveratrol, a polyphenol found in 
red wine, reduces inﬂ  uenza mortality rates in experimen-
tally infected mice (25). Catechins (found in green tea) (26) 
and curcumin (turmeric; found in curry powder) (27) have 
numerous cell-signaling effects, suggesting that they too 
might be beneﬁ  cial. A combination of agents that act on 
both the host response and the virus might be required.
It is becoming increasingly difﬁ  cult for investigators to 
ignore arguments for treating the host response to inﬂ  uenza. 
Recently, investigators showed that giving a neuraminidase 
inhibitor to mice infected with inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) 
was not nearly as effective as treating the mice with an 
antiviral agent and 2 immunomodulatory agents, mesala-
zine, a PPARγ agonist, and celecoxib, a cyclooxygenase 
(COX)–2 inhibitor (28,29). In this model, targeting the host 
response to infection was essential for improving survival 
rates and times. More important, 2 studies in mice showed 
that intratracheal administration of either a fragment of 
the PB1-F2 protein of the 1918 inﬂ  uenza virus (30) or an 
inactivated inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) (31) caused severe 
acute lung injury similar to that seen in fatal human cases 
of inﬂ  uenza (either from the 1918–1920 pandemic or from 
the current H5N1 subtype). In these experimental models, 
there was no virus replication. Thus, antiviral agents would 
have had no effect. Although we still lack direct evidence 
that one or more antiinﬂ  ammatory and immunomodulatory 
agents alone would effectively treat human inﬂ  uenza virus 
A (H5N1) infections, these results and those from the study 
of inﬂ  uenza virus (H2N2)–infected mice treated with gem-
ﬁ  brozil (24) suggest these agents might be effective.
What makes these agents so important is that many of 
them are currently being produced as generic drugs in de-
veloping countries (13,14). These drugs are inexpensive, 
could be produced in abundance, and could even be stock-
piled and made available for use on the ﬁ  rst day of a pan-
demic. No matter what is accomplished in the years ahead, 
adequate supplies of vaccines and speciﬁ  c antiviral agents 
will never be available to persons in developing countries 
on the ﬁ  rst pandemic day.
A Research Agenda to Establish a Generic 
Approach to Pandemic Treatment and Prophylaxis
What types of research on generic agents do we need 
before the pandemic virus appears? First, experimental 
studies of several candidate treatment regimens must be un-
dertaken in mice infected with inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) or 
1918-like viruses (Table 3). The agents used in these stud-
ies might have antiinﬂ  ammatory and immunomodulatory 
or antiviral properties (some might have both), but all must 
be generic agents that are currently produced in developing 
countries. Admittedly, these experimental studies in mice 
will have limitations (32), but they should identify avenues 
for further research. Once a few treatment regimens have 
been shown to be effective in mice, they should be tested in 
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Table 2. Recent studies of patients with pneumonia treated with statins*
Investigator (reference)  Study design and population  Principal outcome 
Adjusted odds ratio (95% CI) 
or % reduction (p value) 
van der Garde et al. (17) Case–control diabetes 
patients, 4,719/15,322 
Pneumonia hospitalization  0.50 (0.28-0.89) 
Schlienger et al. (18) Case–control, 1,227/4,734  Pneumonia hospitalization  0.63 (0.46–0.88) 
30-day pneumonia mortality rate  0.47 (0.25–0.88) 
Mortensen et al. (19) Retrospective cohort, 
1,566/7,086
30-day pneumonia mortality rate  0.54 (0.42–0.70) 
Chalmers et al.  (20) Prospective cohort, 257/750  30-day pneumonia mortality rate  0.46 (0.25– 0.85) 
Thomsen et al. (21) Retrospective cohort,
1,372/28,528
30-day pneumonia mortality rate  0.69 (0.58–0.82) 
Majumdar et al. (22) Prospective cohort, 325/3,090 Hospital mortality rate and ICU admission 
(adjusted for administrative data) 
0.88 (0.63–1.22) 
Hospital mortality rate and ICU admission 
(adjusted for age, propensity score, 
clinical data, and functional status) 
1.10 (0.76–1.60) 
ICU mortality rate  45.4 (0.08)  Choi et al. (23) Randomized controlled trial, 
ICU treatment; 33 with 
atorvastatin and 34 controls 
Hospital mortality rate  51.2 (0.026) 
*Except for the inpatient randomized controlled trial of Choi et al, (23), recent treatment in the observational studies was defined as a statin prescription 
within a period of 30 days (18) to 90 days before hospitalization for pneumonia. CI, confidence interval; ICU, intensive care unit. Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries
ferrets. Later, 2 or 3 of the most promising regimens should 
be tested in nonhuman primates.
After demonstrating the effectiveness of 1 or more 
treatment regimens in animals, inﬂ  uenza virologists should 
then use in vitro systems to deﬁ  ne the molecular mecha-
nisms responsible for their protective activity. However, 
some of these agents will have broader effects on the host 
response. For example, although administering a COX-2 
inhibitor along with a PPARγ agonist improved survival 
rates and times in mice infected with inﬂ  uenza virus A 
(H5N1) (21), another study showed that selective COX-2 
inhibition was detrimental to the resolution of acute lung 
injury (33). Most inﬂ  uenza scientists focus their research 
on the virus or on cell-signaling events associated with vi-
ral pathogenesis (34). Yet the pathophysiologic effects of 
severe infections involve the entire host, something well 
known to researchers who study sepsis (35–37). Their stud-
ies have shown that statins and PPAR agonists stabilize 
myocardial and microvascular function, preserve integrity 
of pulmonary endothelial cell tight junctions and prevent 
pulmonary edema, and promote  resolution of acute inﬂ  am-
mation (13,14). Thus, other investigators with laboratory 
and clinical expertise in critical care, cardiopulmonary dis-
eases, and endocrinology and metabolism must be recruited 
to explore in animals the molecular mechanisms underly-
ing these broad treatment effects on the host. However, in 
undertaking this research, investigators must not forget that 
their primary goal is to ﬁ  nd effective ways to manage a 
pandemic in populations and not simply to explain in more 
precise terms the harmful effects of pandemic virus infec-
tion in individuals.
While these studies are under way, an analysis should 
be undertaken for each candidate agent to determine which 
companies produce them, where each is manufactured, an-
nual levels of production (and surge capacity), patterns of 
distribution to other developing countries, and costs for 
public markets (Table 3). Special attention must be given 
to companies that follow Good Manufacturing Practices to 
minimize the risk that some of these agents might be coun-
terfeit. When animal studies have deﬁ  ned 1 or more prom-
ising regimens, an international process must be set up to 
develop logistics for ﬁ  nancing, producing, and distributing 
each agent.
Where feasible, clinical trials of promising treatment 
regimens might be undertaken in patients with severe sea-
sonal inﬂ  uenza. In a few instances, clinicians might choose 
to treat patients infected with inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) on 
a compassionate basis (12). However, none of these limited 
studies will guarantee that promising treatments in the pre-
pandemic period will be effective against a true pandemic 
virus. Thus, careful plans must be made during the pre-
pandemic period that will enable investigators to conduct 
randomized controlled trials of promising generic regimens 
during the early weeks of a new pandemic. If the case-fa-
tality rate is similar to that of inﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) 
(≈60%), trials will not need to be large (Table 4). Within a 
few days, investigators should be able to recruit sufﬁ  cient 
numbers of patients to satisfy statistical requirements.
Planning for clinical trials during the prepandemic pe-
riod must start with identifying clinical investigators who 
will conduct these trials and institutions that will sponsor 
their work. Supplies of the agents to be tested must be set 
aside, study protocols written, and ethical approval ob-
tained. A mechanism for rapid regulatory approval must 
be developed to enable trials to be conducted wherever the 
pandemic virus ﬁ  rst emerges. A ﬁ  nancing mechanism must 
be established that enables immediate access to funds nec-
essary to support the trials. Finally, an internet-based com-
munication strategy must be devised that ensures prompt 
dissemination of study results to physicians and health of-
ﬁ  cials worldwide.
None of this research on generic agents will be pos-
sible without international coordination. Thus far, the top-
down approach that has characterized vaccine and antivi-
ral research and development has lacked an international 
system for coordination and management to ensure rapid 
progress (2). Likewise, nothing has been done to ensure 
worldwide production and distribution of the vaccines and 
antiviral agents being developed. A similar approach must 
not be allowed to govern the research agenda for generic 
agents.
Experience with the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) in 2003 shows us how we could do much 
better. When SARS ﬁ  rst came to international attention, 
WHO quickly established 3 virtual networks of experi-
enced virologists, clinicians, and epidemiologists (38). By 
sharing experiences and ﬁ  ndings on secure websites and 
in daily teleconferences, investigators soon identiﬁ  ed and 
sequenced the SARS coronavirus, deﬁ  ned the clinical fea-
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Table 3. Research agenda to establish whether generic agents 
could be used for treatment and prophylaxis of a pandemic 
caused by a subtype H5N1–like influenza virus 
1.  Test candidate treatment regimens in mice, ferrets, and 
nonhuman primates to identify specific generic agents that 
might be effective in managing a pandemic 
2.  Study promising generic treatments in cell culture and 
animals to define the molecular mechanisms that explain their 
beneficial effects against influenza virus A (H5N1) and 1918-
like influenza viruses 
3.  Conduct a global analysis to identify developing countries 
where these generic agents are produced and determine 
quantities produced, surge capacities, patterns of distribution, 
and costs to public programs 
4.  Establish an international process to coordinate or manage 
the stockpiling of generic agents and/or their distribution once 
a pandemic virus has emerged 
5.  Plan to conduct randomized controlled trials of promising 
generic treatments immediately after the emergence of a new 
pandemic virus PERSPECTIVE
tures of the disease, and established practical measures for 
clinical management and epidemiologic control. Surpris-
ingly, WHO has not set up a similar system to coordinate 
research and development of vaccines against pandemic 
viruses and antiviral agents, despite the far greater threat 
to global health inherent in an inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) pandemic 
(2). Given escalating pressure from developing countries, 
WHO can ill afford to adopt the same slow approach to 
establishing the scientiﬁ  c basis for using inexpensive and 
widely available generic agents for pandemic control.
Conclusions
Oshitani et al. correctly emphasize that preparing for 
the next pandemic requires a global perspective, but this 
does not necessarily mean that the measures used to con-
front the pandemic in developing countries must be sup-
plied through an internationally organized top-down pro-
cess. An international process will surely be required for 
distributing vaccines and antiviral agents, but experience 
indicates that the process will be slow and cumbersome and 
supplies of these agents will remain scarce (2). Nonethe-
less, developing countries will need abundant supplies of 
effective agents, and abundance will be guaranteed only if 
these agents are generic, inexpensive, and produced in de-
veloping countries themselves.
It is too soon to know whether generic agents could 
be used to confront the next inﬂ  uenza pandemic, yet de-
veloping countries lack realistic alternatives. For this rea-
son, their leaders must convince scientists and international 
organizations, including WHO, of the urgent need for re-
search to determine whether these inexpensive agents could 
mitigate the effects of a pandemic. Otherwise, developing 
and industrialized countries alike could be faced with an 
unprecedented global health crisis.
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etymologia etymologia
Shigella
[shĭ-gel′ə]
Genus of gram-negative bacteria in the family Enterobacteriaceae, named for Japanese bacteriologist Koyoshi 
Shiga (1871–1957). In 1897, Japan experienced a severe dysentery epidemic; >91,000 cases were reported, and 
the case-fatality rate was >20%. Dr Shiga isolated the etiologic agent from patient stool samples: a bacillus, later 
called Shigella dysenteriae. He went on to describe the toxins that the organism produces; one that causes serious 
complications during infections is now known as Shiga toxin.
Sources: Trofa AF, Ueno-Olsen H, Oiwa R, Yoshikawa M. Dr. Kiyoshi Shiga: discoverer of the dysentery bacillus. Clin Infect Dis. 
1999;29:1303–6; Dorland’s illustrated medical dictionary, 31st edition. Philadelphia: Saunders; 2007.